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CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DUE DILIGENCE 
FAILURES
This briefing by the Danish Institute for Human Rights (the Institute) considers civil 
liability for harms linked to business activities and due diligence failures – a key 
consideration in the design of mandatory corporate human rights due diligence laws. 
This briefing is intended to support those designing, advocating for or analysing 
supranational or national human rights due diligence laws, whether in government, 




The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)1 provide that all 
businesses have a responsibility to respect internationally-recognised human rights. 
This responsibility applies regardless of a business’ size, sector, ownership or country 
of operation. It also applies independently of whether governments in a business’ 
home or host state fulfil their duties under international human rights law to protect 
human rights against business-related abuses.2
The UNGPs call for all businesses to undertake human rights due diligence to 
operationalise their responsibility to respect human rights. States should adopt 
legislative and other regulatory measures “to prevent, investigate, punish and 
redress” business-related human rights abuses.3 Such measures are important 
because, to date, business adherence to the corporate respect for human rights has 
been inadequate.4
Aiming to increase corporate respect for human rights, some states have enacted 
new laws to require or encourage businesses to undertake human rights due 
diligence. Others are considering this.5 Mandatory due diligence laws are not 
explicitly required by the UNGPs or other human instruments.6 Nevertheless, such 
laws have a potential role to play as one component of a state’s business and human 
rights regulatory framework.7
Corporate human rights due diligence laws may take different forms. One feature of 
such laws may be rules allowing civil proceedings to be brought against companies 
for “harm” to human rights linked to their due diligence failures. For example, 
France’s Duty of Vigilance Law (the French Law) establishes obligations for large 
companies in France to conduct human rights due diligence, and allows such 
companies to be sued for harms caused by failures to publish and implement a 
“Vigilance Plan” in accordance with the requirements of the law. In other countries, 
provisions to allow new civil claims have not been included in due diligence laws.8 
To inform public debate and support policy development, this briefing highlights key 
issues relating to the role of civil liability in mandatory human rights due diligence 
laws.
Section 2 situates the discussion of civil liability for corporate conduct in its wider 
international human rights law context.
Section 3 identifies existing types of liability (or “causes of action”) for corporate 
human rights abuses, including under tort, administrative, criminal and contract laws, 
which new due diligence laws should take into account.
Section 3 focuses on how corporate “human rights due diligence” may be defined in 




Section 4 examines the general elements of tort claims. It then outlines how these 
elements may apply in claims linked to human rights abuses caused by corporate 
due diligence failures, as provided for by due diligence laws.
Section 5 considers other issues pertaining to the design of a civil liability 
mechanism, such as the inclusion of strict liability offences, extension of liability 
across the supply chain and the availability of due diligence defences or “safe 
harbour” provisions.
Section 6 summarises conclusions of the briefing’s analysis for legislators who are 
considering including civil liability provisions in mandatory corporate human rights 
due diligence laws and other stakeholders.
A table summarising the key features of recently enacted or proposed due diligence 
laws can be found at page 26 of this briefing.
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2. CIVIL LIABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Discussions of whether and how to include civil liability in mandatory corporate 
human rights due diligence laws can quickly become complex and technical. Before 
embarking on detailed discussions, it is therefore worth reflecting on the role of civil 
liability in the context of wider human rights laws.
One important starting point is the right to an effective remedy for a violation of 
human rights.9 This right is widely recognised by international human rights treaties.10 
It entails an obligation to bring to justice perpetrators, and to provide appropriate 
reparation to victims. While domestic legal remedies should always be available, 
these may vary in their details as between national legal systems, while the nature 
of the right in question is also a factor. Generally, the right to remedy is viewed as 
having both substantive and procedural dimensions, the latter entitling victims to an 
adequate, effective and timely investigation. Notably, however, the right to remedy 
is not free-standing, but presumes a violation of another protected human right has 
taken place, or that such a violation is at least arguable.
When it comes to non-state actors, including corporations, states may have a 
“positive obligation” to regulate their activities to prevent harms that would interfere 
with the enjoyment of human rights that the state in question is obliged to protect. 
Effective deterrence of third-party abuses by the state may require, depending on 
circumstances, the criminalisation of private actors’ conduct, the adoption of other 
legislation or policies, or the deployment of operational measures in the case of 
known threats, for example.
In addition, individuals under most human rights instruments have a right to a fair 
and public hearing of their civil rights and obligations, within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law (the civil aspect of the right to 
a fair trial). This can apply, even where the harm complained of in civil proceedings 
does not amount to violation of another human right.
Tort or other civil proceedings may, depending on the circumstances, provide an 
opportunity for domestic authorities both to deal with the substance of a human 
rights complaint and to grant appropriate relief. On the other hand, international 
human rights jurisprudence does not currently demand that states establish due 
diligence laws, or civil liability provisions within them. States have a margin of 
discretion in how to comply with their obligations and the extent and content of 




3. CORPORATE LIABILITY: CAUSES OF ACTION
In most jurisdictions, businesses are exposed to a range of forms of legal liability 
that contribute to remediating human rights abuses or which have potential to do 
so. Mandatory due diligence laws, and any provision for civil liability linked to due 
diligence under them, should take account of any such existing avenues of redress. 
The enactment of new due diligence laws may also influence how courts or other 
bodies interpret and enforce established causes of action against companies. In 
most jurisdictions, proceedings against companies should already find a basis in the 
following:
Tort: Businesses may be liable for certain forms of harm to individuals under the law 
of tort (sometimes referred to as the law of non-contractual obligations).12 A breach 
of human rights as such is not usually a form of harm recognised in national tort laws. 
However, an abuse of human rights may also give rise to a tort claim where the abuse 
causes physical injury or damage to property, for instance.
Framing human rights abuses as tort claims may present a valuable means of 
providing redress and accountability for rights-holders. The availability of tort claims 
may also contribute to fulfilling the state’s duty to ensure access to effective remedy 
under human rights treaties. On the other hand, tort claims may not fully capture 
or offer the best or an appropriate remedy for the wrong done to an individual when 
their human rights are abused. Tort-based remedies do not usually seek to identify 
root causes or provide a mechanism to resolve patterns of abuses beyond the case in 
question.
Generally, for a claim in tort to succeed, the following conditions must be met: the 
type of harm caused to the claimant must be actionable; the defendant must have 
owed a duty of care to the injured party; an action or omission by the defendant 
caused must have caused harm; the harm must have been foreseeable by the 
defendant; the defendant’s conduct must have fallen below the required standard 
of care it owed to the injured party, according to the law; and a court must determine 
that imposing liability on the defendant in relation to the harm sustained by the 
victim is reasonable in all the circumstances. How a company’s performance of due 
diligence may influence their liability under general rules of tort is discussed further 
in Section 5 below.
Statutory liability: In most states, businesses can be liable for breaches of specific 
statutory duties imposed on them, for instance, by national laws on health and safety, 
environment, data protection or privacy, and discrimination.13 When a due diligence 
law is passed, whether a company performs due diligence as required under it 
may become a relevant factor in evaluating its fulfilment of such statutory duties. 
Vice versa, whether companies have complied with specific statutory duties they 
are subject to under other laws may influence courts or regulators in evaluating a 




Criminal liability: Some jurisdictions permit companies, like real persons, to be held 
liable in criminal law. The precise legal rules around this are complex and vary across 
jurisdictions. In some cases, corporate criminal liability is linked to the actions or 
intentions of senior management14 or, alternatively, to failures of “corporate culture”.15 
A company may also be vicariously criminally liable for the acts of employees and 
agents.16
Breach of contract: This may be relevant where a victim and defendant company 
are parties to a contract. Failing to pay wages or maintain adequate health and safety 
standards, for example, might be construed as breaches of an employment contract. 
Company officers may also be held liable via this route.17 By virtue of the principle of 
privity, however, contracts do not usually create rights or duties for persons who are 
not party to them.18 In practice this has limited the relevance of breach of contract 
as a route to remedy for corporate human rights abuses beyond the employment 
context.19
Consumer protection: A specific type of statutory liability, consumer protection laws 
may prohibit false advertising, misleading and deceptive conduct by companies, and 
the production, sale or distribution of dangerous, fake or defective products. Such 
provisions can sometimes be relied on where companies claim to abide by human 
rights standards but fail to do so in practice20 or, for example, where a failure to 
disclose the existence of a human rights harm in the supply chain could be taken to 
mislead consumers in breach of the relevant law.21
KEY POINTS:
• Businesses may be held liable for human rights abuses through a range of 
legal mechanisms
• Causes of action vary across jurisdictions but usually include tort, statutory 
claims, corporate criminal liability, breach of contract and actions under 
consumer laws
• Human rights due diligence laws should, in their design, take account of 
existing liability mechanisms
• Whether or not they provide for civil liability themselves, human rights due 
diligence laws will be likely to influence, and be influenced by, other types of 
corporate liability
• Tort claims can be a valuable means of providing redress and accountability 
to rights-holders but may not be available or be an appropriate or sufficient 
form of remedy for all types of corporate human rights abuse
2021
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4. UNDERSTANDING DUE DILIGENCE
4.1. DEFINING “DUE DILIGENCE”
The phrase “due diligence” has a number of different established meanings. 
For clarity and certainty, these different senses of “due diligence” need to be 
distinguished during discussions and drafting of due diligence laws. The term “due 
diligence” must also be carefully defined in legislation and subsequent guidance for 
businesses, regulators or other actors.
• Corporate human rights due diligence under the UNGPs: In the UNGPs, 
human rights due diligence is a term used to describe a cyclical (or ‘iterative’) 
process22 through which businesses identify, prevent, mitigate and communicate 
publicly about their actual and potential adverse human rights impacts.23 Due 
diligence, in this sense, is a process by which businesses “operationalise” the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights outlined by Pillar II of the 
UNGPs. The UNGPs highlight that the scale and complexity of human rights due 
diligence is expected to vary according to the size, sector, operational context, 
ownership and structure of a business, and with the severity of an enterprise’s 
potential adverse human rights impacts. The responsibility to respect human 
rights is a standard of conduct expected of companies, due diligence being the 
means to meet this responsibility.24 Unlike general corporate “due diligence” 
as practiced outside the human rights context, human rights due diligence 
focuses on identifying risks to rights-holders, rather than risks to the business. 
It is therefore critical that the business engage with a range of stakeholders, 
including rights-holders, as part of the due diligence process, in order to properly 
understand and address its human rights impacts. Since 2011, due diligence as 
understood under the UNGPs has been incorporated into the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises and associated guidance. 25
• Due diligence as a general corporate risk management process: “Due 
diligence” also refers to processes undertaken by companies, or by legal or other 
professionals on their behalf, to identify and manage risks to their business. 
Due diligence processes in this sense are executed, for instance, by parties to 
corporate mergers and acquisitions; for compliance monitoring purposes, in areas 
such as anti-corruption or sanctions; or to assess the risks of specific acts, such 
as employing particular individuals, making a loan, or investing in a particular 
sector. Due diligence assessments in this sense may not refer to risks to human 
rights at all. For some audiences, particularly in a business context, “human rights 
due diligence”, as applied in the UNGPs context, may be mistakenly understood 
to be the same as or similar to the likely more familiar notion of corporate 
due diligence. However, the two are clearly distinguishable in their legal basis, 
objectives, scope, character and consequences.
• Due diligence in international human rights law: Under human rights 
treaties, states can have obligations to prevent certain harms to human rights 
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by private (or ‘non-state’) actors. Failing to fulfil such ‘positive’ duties can result 
in a default by the state on its international legal obligations, where additional 
conditions are met.26 Certain human rights bodies have expressed the state’s 
positive obligations using the language of “due diligence”.27 In this setting, 
“due diligence” is an obligation of conduct expected of states, rather than an 
obligation of result; the standard of conduct to which a state will be held has 
been expressed, in the broader setting of public international law, as that of 
“responsible government”.28
• Corporate human rights due diligence as a standard of care: Some 
commentators have suggested that, mirroring the concept of due diligence 
in international human rights law just described, corporate human rights due 
diligence described by the UNGPs embodies a substantive legal “standard of 
care” owed by businesses to potential victims of harm resulting from their acts or 
omissions, or those of their business partners, throughout the value chain of the 
business in question.29 On this account, a business should be liable for any harms 
it has caused to human rights itself or via business partners, unless it can prove it 
performed an adequate due diligence process.30 There are conceptual and legal 
differences between due diligence obligations on states under human rights 
treaties and the responsibility of companies to undertake due diligence, despite 
a common terminology. On the other hand, this does not exclude that states, 
individually or collectively, may adopt legislation providing for corporate liability 
(civil or otherwise) for harms linked to due diligence failures.
• Due diligence as a defence to liability or ‘safe harbour’: In areas beyond 
human rights, some laws provide a defence to liability where a company meets 
certain criteria, which may be set out in a “safe harbour” exception or due 
diligence defence.31 These are considered in more detail in section 6.3 below.
Policy and scholarly commentaries often do not recognise the spectrum of inter-
related but distinct meanings associated with the term due diligence. Individual 
documents may switch between different meanings or formulations in ways that are 
not readily transparent to legislators or others. 32 Each sense of due diligence noted 
above will entail different consequences if given effect in civil liability provisions of 
mandatory due diligence laws. Full legal analysis, explanatory notes and guidance, 
debate and consultation with stakeholders are therefore essential prerequisites to 
enacting national or other due diligence laws and in connection with proposals for 
including civil liability as an element thereof.
4.2. SCOPE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE: KEY PARAMETERS
Equally, in legislating corporate human rights due diligence requirements, it is 
important to clarify the different parameters of the due diligence process envisaged 
by the UNGPs, which may be thought of in terms of:




• Depth: how far through the supply or value chain a business’s due diligence 
responsibilities extend; and
• Content: the due diligence steps required to be taken by a business in 
accordance with the legal duty.
Besides these dimensions of human rights due diligence, a statutory due diligence 
duty can also vary, amongst others, in terms of:
• the class of companies addressed;33 and
• transparency measures: for instance, requirements on companies to report on 
their due diligence process or outcomes, or to respond to information requests 
from third parties.
Each of these elements will influence the potential extent of companies’ civil liability 
for human rights harms, both within a given legislative scheme, where this is provided 
for, and beyond it, in general tort law and potentially other areas.
4.2.1. Breadth
According to the UNGPs, human rights due diligence should address all 
“internationally-recognised” human rights.34 When undertaking human rights 
due diligence, companies should consider risks to all rights-holders affected or 
potentially affected by the activities of a company or its business partners, rather 
than selected sub-groups, or only rights-holders affected by specific types of human 
rights abuses (e.g. human trafficking, forced or child labour). Some due diligence 
laws do however focus on specific abuses or groups as seen, for instance, in laws on 
modern slavery35 or child labour.36
French37 and German38 due diligence laws, as well as the European Parliament’s 
proposal39 for EU-level due diligence legislation (the EP Proposal), extend the 
scope of due diligence to certain environmental harms as well as human rights. 
Although combined environmental and human rights due diligence legislation is not 
as such contemplated by the UNGPs or currently required by human rights treaties, 
states’ duties under human rights treaties may require the adequate regulation and 
availability of effective remedies for corporate environmental harms. Defining and 
assessing “harm” for the purposes of establishing liability under a due diligence law 
will entail distinct exercises of legal and factual inquiry in relation to environmental 
damage and human rights abuses.
4.2.2. Depth
Due diligence under the UNGPs considers impacts on human rights caused by a 
company’s own activities but also by its business partners. Companies therefore need 
to consider risks throughout the value chain to which they are connected via supply, 
contract, ownership or investment relationships or the use of company products, 
premises or services.
To align with the UNGPs, due diligence laws may require that companies’ due 
diligence processes evaluate their full value chain. Some laws rely on a full value 
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chain risk assessment as a trigger for further specific requirements on companies 
to address or manage risks they pose to human rights.40 Other laws restrict due 
diligence duties to a specific tier of the supply chain.41 While the pros and cons 
of different approaches in this respect are debated, there is a possibility that an 
approach delimited by tier may discourage companies from considering risks in 
tiers outside the legislation’s formal requirements but where the risks of abuses 
may be higher.42 Legislators’ choices regarding the depth of companies’ statutory 
due diligence duties will significantly condition the design and operation of any civil 
liability provisions included in due diligence laws, and vice versa.
4.2.3. Content
The UNGPs outline the main steps of a human rights due diligence process. Yet they 
recognise that due diligence is flexible, context-dependent, dynamic and iterative 
in character and, to achieve its goals, must remain a constant “work in progress”. 
Consistently with the UNGPs, businesses can perform human rights due diligence 
in different ways, relying on variable internal structures, methods, information and 
mechanisms for securing stakeholder input. What in practical terms respecting 
human rights requires of businesses will depend on the business context; a full due 
diligence exercise which spans the entirety of the value chain may not be feasible in a 
given context.43
Due diligence laws also vary in how they describe what they require of businesses. 
They may outline specific steps a company must satisfy to comply with its duties 
under the law or refer to more general criteria. While the French Law requires the 
production of a Vigilance Plan,44 Germany’s law specifies a number of specific due 
diligence elements.45 The Dutch Child Labour Law requires companies to investigate 
whether their goods or services have been produced using child labour and devise 
a plan to prevent it where instances of child labour are identified. The Norwegian 
Transparency Act requires a certain class of companies to carry out and publish 
due diligence assessments related to fundamental rights and decent working 
conditions.46 Whereas some advocates have proposed that due diligence laws should 
express a standard of care or conduct to be achieved by companies rather than the 
means of due diligence, this approach has not yet been adopted in practice.47
4.2.4. Class of businesses
All companies should undertake human rights due diligence, since the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights applies to all businesses, regardless of 
size or other characteristics. Yet legislators may decide to focus statutory due 
diligence duties on a subset of businesses for various reasons. Where they do so, 
the class of companies subject to a statutory due diligence duty may be defined 
with reference to a range of company characteristics. The scope of the French Law, 
for example, is defined with reference to a combination of factors, specifically, the 
number of employees and annual revenue.48 As regards SMEs, some proposed 
laws are restricted to those operating in high-risk sectors or that are publicly listed.49 
Alternatively, statutory duties may apply to all companies in the first instance, with the 
identification of risks by companies triggering additional due diligence requirements, 
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as in the Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Law.50 However the class of companies 
subject to due diligence is defined, the choices made by legislators on this point will 
be in interplay with decisions on whether to include civil liability provisions and if so, 
in what terms.
4.2.5. Transparency
Transparency by companies about human rights risks and measures they have 
taken to address them supports respect for human rights and can help facilitate 
remediation. The UNGPs provide that businesses should communicate about 
their due diligence processes publicly. 51 Mandatory human rights due diligence 
laws include a range of transparency requirements. The Vigilance Plan required by 
the French Law, for instance, requires companies to outline what they have done 
to identify risks and prevent serious violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and serious harms to health and safety and the environment. 
Transparency requirements in other measures are more extensive. Norway’s law, for 
example, requires companies to provide information on how they address human 
rights and decent working conditions in response to requests from any member of 
the public.52 Under the French Law, complying companies are required to publish 
Vigilance Plans in line with criteria set down in the law. In the absence of formal 
guidance on how companies may satisfy the disclosure requirement, the scope of this 
disclosure obligation has been contested in litigation.53
The inclusion of civil liability provisions in due diligence laws may entail greater 
anxiety, and opposition, to such laws’ transparency provisions. Hence, legislators 
will need to strike a balance, taking into account the potential value of both such 
elements within a mandatory due diligence regime.
KEY POINTS:
• “Due diligence” has a range of established meanings which need to be 
distinguished in discussing and enacting due diligence laws.
• “Due diligence” may be used to refer to: human rights due diligence as 
described by the UNGPs; a general corporate risk management process; an 
aspect of states’ duties under international laws; a defence to liability or ‘safe 
harbour’; or a standard of care owed by businesses to affected stakeholders.
• How human rights due diligence is defined in mandatory due diligence 
laws has implications for any associated civil liability regime and potentially 
liabilities beyond the due diligence law in question.
• Legislators and stakeholders should reflect carefully on how the different 
dimensions of corporate human rights due diligence (breadth, depth, 
content), as well as provisions defining the class of businesses subject to 
due diligence, and transparency requirements, interplay with civil liability 
provisions when preparing to enact due diligence laws.
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5. GENERAL ELEMENTS OF TORT LIABILITY 
AND THEIR APPLICATION TO CLAIMS LINKED 
TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY COMPANIES
To succeed in tort proceedings, typically a claimant must show: that a defendant 
owed her a duty of care; that she suffered a recognised form of harm; that the harm 
was foreseeable; that the harm was caused by the acts or omissions of the defendant; 
that such acts or omissions owed to fault on the part of the defendant; and that the 
imposition of liability is in all the circumstances reasonable.54 This section considers 
how these elements may apply in the context of tort claims established by mandatory 
corporate human rights due diligence laws.
5.1. ACTIONABLE HARM
As a general principle, a person seeking a civil remedy for a human rights harm will 
only be able to do so via a domestic court if the law of the particular jurisdiction 
recognises such a harm as a cause of action, for example, by characterising the harm 
as a tort or providing a mechanism for a statutory claim. This requires defining an 
actionable harm. In some countries, actionable harm extends broadly to include 
emotional, economic, or reputational injuries, as well as violations of privacy, 
property, or constitutional rights. Torts may include workplace injury; certain forms 
of environmental damage, occupiers’ liability; defamation; intentional torts such as 
assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
fraud. Still, not all harms suffered by victims, even if they result from a defendant’s 
wrongful acts or omissions, are actionable in civil law. Multiple specific rules, 
furthermore, govern each such type of actionable harm, again varying by jurisdiction. 
In the context of personal injury,55 for instance, injuries that are “harmless” or “de 
minimis”, are unlikely to be recoverable: “material” harm is generally required.
As noted earlier, violations or abuses of human rights under international law as 
such are not in general currently recognised as a cause of actionable harm in tort 
law between private parties. There are exceptions to this general proposition, such 
as the US Alien Tort Statue which provides a civil cause of action for certain defined 
breaches of international law,56 or recent case law from the Canadian context57 which 
recognises the possibility for a civil cause of action based on breaches of customary 
international law. Such causes of action can be challenging. For example, It is not 
exactly clear, for corporate abuses, which country’s law is applicable in assessing 
whether a harm suffered by a claimant also comprised a violation of human rights, or 
what legal analysis should be applied such a determination. Existing due diligence 
laws, and jurisprudence on transnational torts, do not provide specific or generally 
applicable orientation on such matters.
In terms of civil liability provisions included in due diligence legislation, a legislature 
could seek to define a breach of international human rights standards as an 
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actionable harm, which was the approach taken in the recently rejected Swiss 
Responsible Business Initiative proposal (the Swiss RBI Proposal).58 A less 
challenging pathway, given the complexities alluded to above, may be to define 
actionable harm by reference to a breach of an obligation contained in a due 
diligence law, such as a harm caused by a failure to undertake due diligence in 
accordance with the terms of the law. This is indeed the approach adopted by the 
French law. Such a device could work in concert with other pre-existing mechanisms, 
such as pathways to liability through ordinary tort claims, breaches of consumer law 
or constitutional or other claims, depending on the particular legal context.
5.2. DUTY OF CARE
In common law systems, before a tort claim can succeed, it must be established that 
the defendant owed a “duty of care” to the injured party, in the specific circumstances 
in which the harm occurred.59 In common law, a court will determine whether such a 
duty of care linked the claimant and defendant, taking into account various factors.60
Where there is a duty of care, it requires the defendant to exercise a “reasonable” or 
“responsible” standard of care.61 One way of understanding civil liability provisions 
in due diligence laws, then, is that they seek to establish a duty of care between a 
company and potential victims of human rights abuses linked to the activities of 
the company or its business partners, as such a wide-ranging duty of care might not 
otherwise exist.62
Recent due diligence laws rely on different formulations and approaches in 
establishing a duty of care. The Swiss RBI proposal,63 for instance, would have 
imposed a duty of care on businesses to “respect internationally recognised human 
rights and environmental standards”64 and to “ensure that human rights and 
environmental standards are also respected by businesses under their control”.65
The French Law, by contrast, declines to express a broad corporate duty to respect 
human rights. Rather, it imposes a specific duty on businesses to publish and 
implement a “vigilance plan” and permits a claim by any victim of “serious violations 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, risks and serious harms to health and 
safety and the environment”, if the victim can show that the company’s failure to 
publish and implement such a plan caused the harm suffered.66
The German law requires companies to identify, prevent and mitigate risks in 
their own operations and arising in their first tier suppliers, and to undertake a risk 
analysis and develop appropriate preventative measures where the company has 
“substantiated knowledge” of a violation of human rights or environmental standards 
in suppliers beyond the first tier.
Obviously, the wider the scope of the duty of care expressed by a due diligence law, 
the greater the number of potential victims and claimants who may in principle 
benefit. Yet it will remain for courts to interpret and apply such provisions in individual 
cases coherently with general norms and elements of civil liability in other areas.
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For companies with transnational activities and value chains, those who may 
be potentially affected by their activities or via those of their business partners 
are dispersed worldwide. Their number, location or identity may be constantly 
changing. Notwithstanding a broadly framed duty of care in a due diligence law, 
such considerations, it should be recognised, may dissuade courts from finding 
the imposition of such a duty of care “reasonable in all the circumstances”, or that 
harm sustained was “foreseeable”. In this respect, restricting the duty of care in due 
diligence laws, for the purposes of civil liability, to certain categories of business 
activity or tiers of the value chain could carry some potential advantages. Finally, 
the scope of the due diligence exercise required under the UNGPs will not in 
general map reliably to the scope of the duty of care in civil liability. Administrative 
supervision and sanctions can play an important role to bridge the gap in 
circumstances where the scope of the due diligence requirement is broader than the 
scope of potential liability.
5.3. STANDARD OF CARE
Besides showing that a defendant owed her a duty of care, in tort a claimant 
must also establish that her treatment by the defendant fell below the expected 
“reasonable” or “responsible” standard of care. In litigation, this element 
comprises two parts: determining the standard of care owed (a question of law); 
and demonstrating that the defendant’s conduct in fact fell below the standard 
of care owed (a question of fact). In tort proceedings beyond the due diligence 
scenario, diverse factors may be deemed relevant in determining the latter question, 
according to the context at hand. The process of human rights due diligence is not 
disconnected from its outcomes, which can be relevant in assessing the adequacy or 
reasonableness of human rights due diligence in a particular instance.67
Due diligence laws may indicate some elements of the required standard of care. The 
French law for instance specifies certain elements of the due diligence “vigilance 
plan” required of companies. If these elements are not delivered by a company, it 
suggests the required standard of care has not been met. In addition, however, it can 
be expected that, besides such elements as are specified in due diligence laws, and 
the UNGPs themselves, formal and informal guidance68 on how companies should 
conduct due diligence, as well as companies’ own policy documents and public 
communications, will be used by courts and others to assess whether a company 
conducted itself “reasonably” or “responsibly” in a given case.
This will be particularly so where due diligence laws rely on open formulations 
such as “reasonable due diligence” or “appropriate due diligence”69 in defining 
the required standard of care. This issue will assume special importance where 
conducting adequate due diligence is deemed by a due diligence law as a defence to 
corporate liability.70
Supply chain or other industry sustainability schemes are also potentially relevant 
in connection with the standard of care. It might be considered that a company’s 
participation in such schemes, particularly those certified or otherwise approved by 
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regulators,71 should be deemed probative of meeting the required standard of care in 
relation to civil liability under a due diligence law. On the other hand, the adequacy of 
such schemes in addressing the human rights impacts of participating companies is 
uncertain.72 On this basis, the evidentiary value of participation in industry- or supply-
chain schemes with regard to assessing whether a company has met the required 
standard of care (and also in relation to “safe harbour”, see Section 6.3 below) seems 
unclear.
5.4. CAUSATION
In tort law, a defendant’s actions or omissions must have caused the harm sustained 
by the claimant for her claim to succeed. Outside of law, factual causation can 
be loosely assessed by a “but-for” test: would the harm have occurred but-
for the defendant’s wrongful act or omission? “Legal causation” embodies a 
similar requirement, but in combination with other elements, including that the 
harm complained of must have owed to the defendant’s wrongful conduct and 
“foreseeability”. Civil law also generally recognises contributory causation, so that 
damages, if awarded, may be apportioned between multiple defendants each of 
whom have contributed to injury in a given situation, for instance, with damages being 
weighted according to their respective roles in causing harm.
Causation in the context of human rights abuses linked to businesses may be 
amenable to such analysis. In other scenarios, it is harder to see how courts might 
proceed in determining causation and allocating liability, for instance, where 
a company has conducted itself in accordance with national legislation; where 
government bodies have permitted a specific business activity; in situations where 
a company is in a government joint venture; or where deliberate efforts have been 
taken by third parties to conceal unlawful conduct from a defendant company.
Due diligence laws vary in their approach to causation. Under the French law, 
causation is to be determined in line with general principles of French tort law.73 The 
EP legislative proposal provides that a company may be liable for harms it causes 
or “contributes to”. While a definition of causation is not provided, the EP legislative 
proposal defines “contribute to” as meaning that “an undertaking’s activities, in 
combination with the activities of other entities, cause an impact, or that the activities 
of the undertaking cause, facilitate or incentivise another entity to cause an adverse 
impact.” The contribution, it is further stated, must be “substantial”, meaning that 
minor or trivial contributions are excluded. The EP legislative proposal further 
suggests that “contribution” can be assessed with reference to three factors: (a) the 
extent to which an undertaking’s activities may encourage or motivate an adverse 
impact by another entity; (b) the extent to which an undertaking could or should have 
known about the adverse impact or potential for adverse impact, i.e. the degree of 
foreseeability; and (c) the degree to which any of the undertaking’s activities actually 
mitigated the adverse impact or decreased the risk of the impact occurring.74 Hence, 
on the EP’s approach, determining contribution would entail the undertaking of a 
complex legal and factual analysis.
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As noted earlier, a company’s human rights due diligence process, in line with the 
UNGPs, should encompass adverse impacts in all three categories of involvement: 
“causing”, “contributing” or being “directly linked” to human rights impacts.75 It 
has been acknowledged that these three “categories” however function more as a 
spectrum. 76 To complicate matters further, evidently there is no clear or automatic 
relationship between the three categories of involvement declined by the UNGPs and 
the element of causation required to be made out for the purposes of establishing 
civil liability.
Pending the application of civil liability provisions of due diligence laws in the 
courts, it will remain ambiguous whether certain actions or omissions by companies 
constitute causation as a required element of legal liability. It is unknown at present 
whether such ambiguity, linked to the prospect of civil liability, will encourage 
businesses to redouble their due diligence efforts, with the aim of managing human 
rights risks effectively; or, on the other hand, whether it will discourage due diligence 
because companies or their legal advisors fear the due diligence exercise will 
yield a paper trail that may be helpful to claimants in the context of civil litigation. 
Legislators must be mindful of these possibilities when designing a civil liability 
mechanism.
Specifying the elements of the required due diligence process to be undertaken by 
companies, either in legislation, or formal guidance, is therefore important.
5.5. FORESEEABILITY
Foreseeability, in the ordinary law of tort, has the function of setting an outer limit to 
the scope of parties’ legal liability. Even if a defendant caused harm to a claimant to 
whom it owed a duty of care, through actions or omissions falling below the required 
standard of care, the claim will not succeed unless the court holds that the harm 
was also reasonably foreseeable, in other words, that it could reasonably have been 
expected.77
It seems likely that mandatory due diligence laws will have some influence on 
determinations of foreseeability in relevant cases. For instance, where harms 
complained of by a claimant ought to have been identifiable by a due diligence 
exercise conducted to a reasonable standard, and a defendant is under a specific 
legal duty to conduct such due diligence, it would appear harder to argue that the 
harm caused was unforeseeable. Vice versa, the foreseeability requirement may 
constrain the scope of liability prima facie provided for under due diligence laws, if 
courts deem harms complained of as unforeseeable.78
The UNGPs require that human rights due diligence addresses actual and potential 
human rights impacts across a company’s value chain. They also envisage that 
a business enterprise may cause or contribute to adverse human rights impacts 
that were not foreseeable, even with the “best policies and practices”.79 Again, this 
highlights discrepancies between the concept of due diligence under the UNGPs 
and the elements of civil liability. In seeking to enact civil liability provisions in due 
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diligence laws, legislators and others should be aware of this and the boundaries 
on liability that may potentially be introduced via foreseeability or similar 
requirements.80
KEY POINTS:
• Not all corporate human rights abuses can be readily analysed as torts.
• The standard elements of torts (including actionable harm, duty of care, 
standard of care, causation, foreseeability) will generally be required to be 
met for companies to be held liable under civil liability provisions of due 
diligence laws.
• Performing due diligence under the UNGPs is not fully equivalent to 
fulfilment of a duty of care: depending on the exact circumstances to hand, 
a company that undertakes an adequate due diligence exercise may still 
be liable for harm; on the other hand, a company that does not undertake 
adequate due diligence and which causes harm, may not be liable, for other 
reasons .
• Legislators should be aware of the constraints that will likely be imposed by 
general tort law principles on the scope of liability under due diligence laws.
• Legislators will need to balance the advantages civil liability provisions 
against their potential influence on the performance of due diligence by 





Generally, as seen above, tort liability follows a finding that a defendant was at fault. 
Exceptionally, however, the law may establish “strict liability” offences where no fault 
on the part of a defendant is needed. Such offences, which are narrowly defined or 
limited in advance to specific factual circumstances, are found in the areas of product 
liability, defamation and infringement of intellectual property rights, for example.
Some strict liability regimes incorporate a due diligence defence, whereby a 
defendant can avoid liability by showing it took adequate measures to avoid the harm 
complained of.81 The Swiss RBI proposal would have introduced a due diligence 
defence to strict liability of a controlling company for harm caused by entities under 
its control.82 Other due diligence laws have not however relied on such a mechanism.
In principle, mandatory due diligence laws could combine both fault-based and 
strict liability. For example, strict liability might be attached to grave harms, such as 
child labour, forced labour or discrimination, while fault-based liability could attach 
to other harms. Yet such an approach could also divert due diligence efforts to such 
harms, even where this was not warranted, in terms of risk. Such factors will need to 
be weighed carefully in the design of due diligence legislation.
6.2. LIABILITY ACROSS THE SUPPLY OR VALUE CHAIN
The corporate responsibility to respect human rights expressed by the UN 
Framework and UNGPs extends to all a businesses’ activities and relationships, 
regardless of where they occur in its value or supply chains. This is important because 
a business’ impacts may not be confined to its own activities of those of its immediate 
suppliers. In some cases, its greatest and most severe impacts may occur at some 
remove, for instance, in the context of primary production of commodities or “raw 
materials”.
For a variety of reasons, holding parent companies liable for subsidiaries and “lead 
companies” liable for abuses at the “bottom” of a supply chain may be legally 
challenging. The immediate perpetrators of human rights abuses may be separated 
from parent or “lead companies” by many layers of contracting, ownership and 
geographical distance, for instance. In such a scenario, defendants are likely to argue 
that the requirements of causation and foreseeability, amongst others, are not met. 
Indeed, this approach has been taken by defendants even where harms occurred in 
the first tier of their supply chain. 83
Due diligence duties, for reasons explained above, should in themselves make it 
harder for companies to sustain such arguments, as do supply chain transparency 
rules. Yet it may be thought that civil liability provisions in due diligence laws should 
make explicit their extension beyond the first tier, further to avoid this outcome.
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To this end the French Law provides specifically that a company may be liable 
for harms where it “exercised control” over or had an “established commercial 
relationship” with the party immediately responsible for causing harm. 84 Control, 
under the French Commercial Code, is defined as ”exclusive control” which gives 
a company “decision-making power, in particular over the financial and operational 
policies of another entity”.85 This can be of a legal, de facto or contractual nature 
and includes first- and lower tier subsidiaries.86 Under the French law, companies 
may hence be liable for harms perpetrated by controlled entities or suppliers in an 
established commercial relationship where such harms could have been avoided by 
establishing or implementing a vigilance plan.
Under the EP Proposal, companies would be required to provide remediation for 
harms they, or undertakings under their control, have caused or contributed to.87 Here 
the concept of control is defined as “the possibility for an undertaking to exercise 
decisive influence on another undertaking, in particular by ownership or the right to 
use all or part of the assets of the latter, or by rights or contracts or any other means, 
having regard to all factual considerations, which confer decisive influence on the 
composition, voting or decisions of the decision making bodies of an undertaking”.88
The concept of control in the Swiss RBI proposal included both the control that 
a parent company may exercise over its subsidiaries but also included “economic 
control”, a sufficiently expansive concept to include the market position of a company 
in relation to its supplier and the terms of the contract between the two entities.89 
Accordingly, this approach would have embraced situations where a lead company 
exercised control over a supplier.90 Yet this approach might also entail of discouraging 
parent companies or lead firms from involving themselves in the management 
subsidiaries or suppliers.91
In the UK, rather than control per se, recent case law has focused on the extent to 
which the parent “voluntarily assumed” or did take over or share with the subsidiary 
the management of the relevant activity, which “may or may not be demonstrated 
by the parent controlling the subsidiary”. 92 A parent may incur responsibility to 
third parties if, in its published materials, it holds itself out as exercising that degree 
of supervision and control of its subsidiaries, whether or not it does in fact do so.93 
Enactment of statutory duties explicitly linking suppliers and subsidiaries with parent 
and lead companies may not in all jurisdictions be required, if tort law has evolved to 
sustain such linkages by other devices, such as expanding the potential scope of a 
general tortious duty of care.
6.3. DUE DILIGENCE DEFENCE AND “SAFE HARBOUR”
The analysis above has shown that, while the performance of due diligence by 
a company may be relevant to a determination of civil liability in various ways, it 
is unlikely to be conclusive of it. This accords with the UNGPs observation that 
while “conducting appropriate human rights due diligence should help business 
enterprises address the risk of legal claims against them”, on the other hand, 
“business enterprises conducting such due diligence should not assume that, by 
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itself, this will automatically and fully absolve them from liability for causing or 
contributing to human rights abuses.”94
In the context of statutory due diligence schemes, it may be considered that 
fulfilment of a statutory due diligence requirement should be allowed to operate as a 
defence, i.e. a company would avoid liability if it could demonstrate it had undertaken 
a due diligence exercise that was adequate and appropriate in the circumstances. For 
example, the UK Bribery Act 2010 establishes a criminal offence of failure to prevent 
bribery.95 However, it also establishes a defence for a company that has put in place 
“adequate procedures” to protect against bribery and corruption.96
The EP’s legislative proposal, would also provide a form of due diligence defence, 
allowing “undertakings that prove[d] that they took all due care in line with this 
Directive to avoid the harm in question, or that the harm would have occurred even if 
all due care had been taken” should not be held liable for that harm.97
Under the Swiss RBI proposal, to avoid liability a company would have needed prove 
that it exercised appropriate due diligence to prevent the damage in question.98
The availability of a human rights due diligence defence to civil liabilities under 
a due diligence law, or generally, could incentivise businesses to implement 
human rights due diligence measures, furthering prevention.99 Such a preventive 
role presumes that companies’ due diligence exercises are assessed against an 
appropriate benchmark: cosmetic or “box-ticking” due diligence exercises should 
not serve to shield companies that have caused actionable harm. This highlights the 
potential role of formal due diligence guidance, associated with due diligence laws, 
without which courts may be uncertain of what standard of due diligence to apply. 
Yet on the other hand, the context-dependent character of due diligence entails that 
courts would still need to interpret how formal guidance, if produced, should be 
implemented in a cases’ specific circumstances.
Notably, a “safe harbour” doctrine, though similar, is distinguishable from a defence 
in legal terms. A “safe harbour” may exist where a legislature has intended that a 
statutory duty be accompanied by a shield from liability in some form. For example, 
litigation based on disclosures made under the California Transparency in Supply 
Chains Act 2010 has held that the Act created a “safe harbour” whereby a company 
would be shielded from civil liability where they truthfully and accurately complied 




Fault-based and strict liability
• Strict liability offences are narrowly defined
• Strict liability offences and fault-based liability may be combined in due 
diligence regimes
• Differentiated approaches may help focus company attention on the gravest 
abuses but at the same time may divert risk management efforts from more 
salient risks.
Liability across the supply chain
• There are potential advantages and disadvantages of defining liability 
provisions with reference to tiers of the supply or value chain that need to be 
carefully evaluated
• Due diligence laws have applied a range of approaches in defining the extent 
of companies’ potential liability across the supply chain, with reference to 
control or assumption of responsibility, amongst others
Due diligence as a defence
• A due diligence defence might incentivise businesses to implement human 
rights due diligence measures, furthering prevention
• However this presumes that companies’ due diligence exercises can 
be assessed in court against appropriate benchmarks and the need for 




Due diligence legislation has an important role to play in advancing implementation 
of the state duty to protect, the corporate responsibility to respect and the right 
of victims to remediation, as well as more specific elements of the UNGPs and 
responsible business conduct.
Provisions holding companies accountable for due diligence failures, including 
by attaching liability and penalties, are key to prevention of abuses and promoting 
effective risk management by companies.
At the same time, law-makers and others should reflect carefully on the range of 
mechanisms that can be relied on to achieve such accountability. As illustrated by this 
briefing linking corporate human rights due diligence as envisaged by the UNGPs to 
tort liability in mandatory corporate due diligence laws presents complex challenges. 
Although it is one route to remedy, tort-based liability does not offer a universally 
appropriate or complete remedy for corporate human rights abuses, while judicial 
proceedings, given associated cost and delays, will in many cases remain a remedy of 
last resort for victims.101
Accordingly, any mandatory human rights due diligence measure must be supported 
by a range of other mechanisms, including enforcement by an empowered and 
adequately resourced regulator102 and effective operational level grievance 
mechanisms.
Finally, while the building blocks of liability mechanisms as highlighted here are 
common to many jurisdictions, they vary in the exact character according to local 
context and there is no ‘one size fits all’ template for the design of human rights due 
diligence legislation. Accordingly, besides general analyses such as the present one, 
jurisdictionally-specific studies are needed to inform national and regional legislative 











Large companies, listed 
SMEs and 
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fiscal years, and which:













Defeated in a 
referendum held on 29 
November 2020.
All companies that have 
their registered office, 
central
administration, or 
principal place of 
business in Switzerland.
Adopted but not in force 
until 1 January 2023.
Companies that 
have their central 
administration, 
headquarters or 
registered office in 
Germany, provided they 
have more than 3,000 
employees in Germany.
Adopted but not in force 
until 2022.
Companies registered 
in the Netherlands and 
companies from abroad 
selling goods and 
delivering services to 
Dutch customers.
Adopted but not yet in 
force. Effective date to 
be determined.
All larger companies 
domiciled in Norway, 
as well as foreign 
companies selling 
products and services 
in Norway. The law 
uses the Norwegian 
Accounting Act to 
define company size. 
Companies meeting 
at least two out of the 
following three criteria 
are covered by the act:
• At least 50 man-
years;
• Turnover of at least
70 million NOK;
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Requires that Member 
states lay down 
rules to ensure that 
companies carry out a 
due diligence process 








and implement a 
“vigilance plan” (plan 
de vigilance). This 
plan should include 
“reasonable vigilance 
measures adequately 
to identify risks and 
prevent serious 
violations of human
Companies would have 
been required to carry 
out appropriate due 
diligence. In particular 
they must: identify real 
and potential impacts 
on internationally 
recognized human 





and ongoing due 
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on the human rights 
and environmental 
protections specified in 





required to conduct 
due diligence related 
to child labour and 
submit a statement to 
a supervising authority 
declaring that they 
have investigated risks 
of child labour in their 
activities and supply 
chains.
Companies are required 
to implement due 
diligence with respect 
to human rights and 
decent work, and to 
document how they 
work to prevent or limit 
these risks. The law 
requires companies to 















with respect to human 
rights, environmental 
and governance risks.
rights and fundamental 
freedoms, risks and 
serious harms to health 
and safety and the 
environment”.
to prevent the violation 
of internationally 
recognized human 
rights and international 
environmental 
standards, cease 
existing violations, and 
account for the actions 
taken.
• Defining internal 
responsibilities 
Carrying out regular 
risk assessments




the fulfillment of 
the due diligence 
obligations
this is due.
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The company’s own 
operations and across 
the whole value chain.
The company’s own 











own operations and 
controlled companies 
as well as to all business 
relationships
The company’s own 
operations including 
subsidiaries where 
the parent company 
exercises determinative 
influence over the 
subsidiary, and first tier 
suppliers.
Companies are also 
required to identify 
risks linked to suppliers 
beyond Tier 1 on an ad 




The company’s own 
operations and supply 
chain.
The company’s own 
operations and across 
the whole value chain.












Publish a due 
diligence strategy 
on the company’s 
website and upload it 





Publish a Vigilance Plan 
in the annual report
Publish annual reports 
on the fulfilment of 
the due diligence 
obligations company’s 
website and submit 
them to the competent 
authority.
Statements prepared 
under the Act have to 
be lodged within six 
months from the date 
the Act enters into 
force, will be then made 
publicly available by 
the national competent 
authority. Companies 
are required to produce 
the statement only 
once, rather than 
annually.
Companies must also 
report on due diligence 
policies and routines for 
handling risks to human 
rights and decent work, 
including cases of 
severe risk or harmful 
incidents to authorities. 
The information must 
also be made readily 
available digitally on the 
company’s websites.
The law also provides 
anyone who so pleases 
the right to request 
information from a 
company on how they 
manage their due 
diligence.
Transparency
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Member States are 
required to establish a 
liability regime under 
which undertakings 
can be held liable 
in accordance with 
national law and 
provide remediation 
for any harm arising 
out of potential or 
actual adverse impacts 
on human rights, the 
environment or good
A company may be 
liable under the French 
Civil Code if its failure 
to establish, implement 
and publish a Vigilance 
Plan caused harm to 
fundamental freedoms, 
health and safety or the 
environment.
The proposal included 
a liability mechanism 
which would have 
created an avenue 
for claimants to bring 
claims in Swiss courts 
with respect to human 
rights violations 
and environmental 
pollution. The liability 
mechanism extended 
to acts of subsidiaries 
and for economically
No new civil liability 
mechanism.
No new civil liability 
mechanism.














governance that they, 
or undertakings under 
their control, have 
caused or contributed to 
by acts or omissions.
Liability under this 
proposal provides a 
form of due diligence 
defence as follows: 
“undertakings that 
prove that they took all 
due care in line with this 
Directive to avoid the 
harm in question, or that 
the harm would have 
occurred even if all due 
care had been taken” 
should not be held 
liable for that harm.
controlled companies.
A potential shield from 
liability was available 
if the company could 
show that it had 
undertaken appropriate 
due diligence.
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